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A THEORY OF CONSTRUCTIVE 
INTERPRETATION FOR CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IDENTIFICATION
Nadia Banteka*
The definition, scope, and identification of customary international law 
(“CIL”) have been debated since the inception of international law.1 Ac-
cording to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) and 
the Court’s jurisprudence, CIL derives from general state practice and opin-
io juris.2 In other words, an emerging norm rises to the level of a CIL obli-
gation when states who exhibit that behavior act out of a belief or sense of 
legal obligation, rather than simply out of habit. CIL has since been con-
ceived as a duality interpreted into a set of two elements: the first is quanti-
tative, objective, and material, based on how states have acted in the past; 
the second is qualitative, subjective, and psychological, based on a notion of 
legal duty, obligation, or right.
International law has largely expanded since 1945 to include many 
fields and actors that were completely unarticulated or roughly conceived at 
that time.  Areas such as human rights, environmental law, investment law, 
human security, and many more receive different attention than that of half 
a century ago.  What Louis Henkin characterized as a move from state val-
ues to human values, and from a liberal state system to a welfare state sys-
tem, has altered both our conception of CIL and the relationship between its 
two elements.3
Due to the emergence of new actors in the international system that re-
shuffled its normative calibration and priorities, a new environment surfaced 
where there is neither a clear, common understanding of how CIL norms are 
identified, nor agreement on the content of those norms.  States and scholars 
argue, for instance, that torture is and is not justifiable under international 
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1. Norra Arajarvi, The Changing Nature of Customary International Law: The Meth-
ods of Interpreting International Criminal Tribunal 152 (2014).
2. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, opened for signature June 26, 
1945, 3 U.S.T. 1153; North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 73 (Feb. 20).
3. Louis Henkin, Human Rights (2d ed. 2009).
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human rights law;4 that states are and are not responsible for their failure to 
prevent injury to the environment or another state;5 and that states do and do 
not have an obligation to protect the populations of third-party states when 
their fundamental rights are being systematically abused.6 All of these posi-
tions are potentially tenable within the current state of CIL indeterminacy 
due to the absence of a consistent CIL identification method that provides 
legal certainty.  This makes CIL vulnerable to critique that it cannot func-
tion as a legitimate source of substantive legal norms in a decentralized 
world of nations that lacks a broad sense of shared values.
The relationship between CIL’s two elements of state practice and opin-
io juris comes in many shades.  For instance, in the Asylum and Fisheries
cases, the ICJ looked equally at both elements of state practice and opinio 
juris7 and reaffirmed this approach in the Rights of Nationals of the US in 
Morocco8 and the Nottebohm decisions.9 In the Nicaragua decision, the ICJ 
held that practice ought to be appraised in light of the subjective element of 
opinio juris.10 The Court here considered it sufficient for conduct to be gen-
erally consistent with expressions and statements of rules insofar as contrary 
state practice has largely been “treated as breaches of that rule, not as indi-
4. See SANFORD LEVINSON ET AL., TORTURE : A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 
2004); ALAN W. CLARKE, RENDITION TO TORTURE (2012); MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH 
MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE : A COMMENTARY
(2008); John C. Yoo, A Crucial Look at Torture Law, in CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. NATIONAL 
SECURITY IN A POST-9/11 WORLD 321, 321–323 (M. Katherine B. Darmer et al. eds., 2004);
John Yoo, The U.S. Military Need Not Obey the Geneva Conventions When Dealing with Sus-
pected Terrorists, in IS TORTURE EVER JUSTIFIED? 26–30 (Tom Head ed., 2005); Memoran-
dum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Mar. 14, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatants
outsideunitedstates.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
5. See MICHAEL MASON, THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITY: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ACROSS BORDERS (2005); TUOMAS KUOKKANEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: VARIATIONS ON A THEME (2002); Miron Mushkat & Roda Mush-
kat, The Political Economy of Hong Kong’s Transboundary Pollution, 9 J. INT’L TRADE L. &
POL’Y 175, 175–192 (2010).
6. See Nadia Banteka, Dangerous Liaisons: The Responsibility to Protect and a Re-
form of the U.N. Security Council, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 382, 382–423 (2016); 
GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE 
AND FOR ALL (2008); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Alex 
J. Bellamy & Tim Dunne eds., 2016); JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: WHO SHOULD INTERVENE? (2010); THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marc Weller et al. eds., 2015).
7. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. Rep. 266, ¶ 276 (Nov. 20); Fisher-
ies (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, ¶ 138 (Dec. 18).
8. Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1952 I.C.J. Rep. 176, ¶ 200 (Aug. 27).
9. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 1 (Apr. 6).
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 147–48 (June 27).
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cations of the recognition of a new rule.”11 In the Corfu Channel case, the 
Court engaged in a deductive analysis to assess Albania’s obligation to noti-
fy others of the existence of a minefield in its territorial waters.  The ICJ 
found that this obligation existed based “on certain general and well-
recognized principles”12 and, more specifically, the principle of “elementary 
considerations of humanity.”13 However, unlike in the Nicaragua decision, 
the Court did not scrutinize whether this principle represented general state 
practice, opinio juris, or an altogether different source of international law.14
Despite these different shades, the ICJ always tries to consider both el-
ements of state practice and opinio juris in its deliberations on CIL identifi-
cation. However, due to the indeterminacy of the relationship between its 
elements, the CIL identification debate has been trapped in a singular meth-
odological dispute between induction and deduction.  According to the in-
ductive method, CIL stems from ‘facts’ of the international life15 and its
identification takes place by collecting and systematizing facts of state con-
duct—what we know as state practice.16 Proponents of the inductive ap-
proach in CIL identification go as far as to suggest that we dispense with 
opinio juris as an element of CIL altogether and rely instead only on state 
practice.17  On the other hand, the deductive method focuses on the abstract 
and deduces CIL norms from general propositions deriving from non-
factual, often normative authorities.18 Unlike the inductive claim, the deduc-
tive process is one that begins with general statements of rules rather than 
particular instances of practice.19 Rules of CIL are then deduced from these 
11. Id. ¶ 186.
12. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, ¶ 22 (Apr. 9).
13. Id.
14. Id.; BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER, DEVELOPMENT IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
141 (2010).
15. SCHLÜTTER, supra note 14.
16. See, e.g., BRUNO SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENERAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 153, 216 (1995); S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. 
Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (holding that binding interna-
tional law derives from the will of states as expressed via their actions and in conventions 
generally accepted as expressing principles of international law).
17. See Paul Guggenheim, Les Deux Eléments de la Coutume en Droit International, in
LA TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINCIPES DU DROIT PUBLIC: ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR DE GEORGES 
SCELLE 275 (Charles Rousseau ed., 1950); H. Kelsen, Théorie du Droit International Coutu-
mier, 1 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA THÉORIE DU DROIT 253 (1939). Both have, however, 
revised their opinion in later contributions. See HANS KELSEN & ROBERT W. TUCKER,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 440 (Holt et al. eds., 1966) (adding a second element to 
the definition of custom: that the individuals exercising the relevant action or abstention are 
convinced that they fulfill a duty or exercise a right); MARCEL SIBERT, TRAITÉ DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC: LE DROIT DE LA PAIX 101 (1951); PAUL GUGGENHEIM, TRAITÉ DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (2d ed. 1967).
18. HANS, supra note 17; SIBERT supra note 17; GUGGENHEIM supra note 17
19. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 89 (1989).
304 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:301
general statements and principles as these are reflected in the conduct and 
discourse of states.
Modern international judicial lawmaking and scholarship engage with 
both the inductive and the deductive methods, but largely approach them as 
opposite and mutually cancelling.20  However, these two methods represent 
two ends of a spectrum.  International law has yet to engage systematically 
with other methodological approaches that lay within this spectrum.  In this 
Article, I examine a mid-VSHFWUXP DSSURDFK ZKHUH IDFW DQG SULQFLSOHʊRU
content and valueȸare knit together through constructive interpretation.21
This approach does not strictly divide the two elements of CIL into a binary, 
but instead views them as interwoven.  The goal of constructive interpreta-
tion is to impose purpose on a practice in order to put it in the best possible 
light within the constraints of its factual history and shape.22 Very often, 
competing interpretations will arise for the same practice, in which case the 
preferred interpretation is the one that proposes the most value for the prac-
tice, all other things being equal.23 Where a deductive methodology looks 
for a connection between principle and law, and an inductive methodology 
searches for social facts that establish general practice, constructive inter-
pretation asserts that “propositions of law are true if they . . . provide the 
best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”24 The 
main proponent of constructive interpretation is Ronald Dworkin, whose in-
20. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 898, 900 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) (asserting that omis-
sions by states are evidence of customary law and that any state agency can contribute to that 
state’s customary law); Michel Virally, Le Rôle des “Principes” dans le Développement du 
Droit International, in LA TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINCIPES DU DROIT PUBLIC: ETUDES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE PAUL GUGGENHEIM 531, 550 (1968) (demonstrating that a declaration of 
principle constitutes a method of establishing a rule of customary law); Andrew T. Guzman, 
Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 115, 124–25 (2005) (suggesting 
that “diplomatic correspondence, treaties, public statements by heads of state, [and] domestic 
laws” can serve to demonstrate state practice); see also Michael Akehurst, Custom as a 
Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 1, 4 (1977) (canvassing and criticizing 
the debate among scholars regarding whether a given category of state action merely confirms 
the existence of an already recognized custom or whether such state action is being employed 
by a state with a view to the establishment of custom). Although this broad approach to state 
practice is disputed, it reflects the majority of academic commentators and the legal jurispru-
dence. See Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Cus-
tomary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 525–30 (2004) 
(distinguishing between the subjective and objective elements, with respect to the formation 
of customary law, that are present in the practices of any state); Fernando R. Tesón, The Lib-
eral Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 871 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2004); Christian Tomuschat, Ob-
ligation Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, in 241 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (1993).
21. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 48 (1986).
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 225.
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sights I will build upon in an attempt to evaluate and transpose the construc-
tive interpretation claim in international law and in CIL identification in 
particular.
In the first part of this Article, I introduce the most popular theories of 
CIL identification and connect them to relevant jurisprudence of the ICJ.  
Then, I address the analytical thread that underlies the different theoretical 
and jurisprudential approaches: the divide between induction and deduction. 
As a middle ground in this divide, I introduce Ronald Dworkin’s theory of 
constructive interpretation along with a theory for its application to interna-
tional law in the second part of the Article.  I put forward the guiding prin-
ciples of constructive interpretation, examine the process of constructive in-
terpretation in the abstract, and apply it specifically to CIL identification.  I 
argue that constructive interpretation holds significant advantages over ex-
isting methods of CIL identification because it facilitates the resolution of 
the two main CIL impasses: (1) the relationship between general state prac-
tice and opinio juris; and (2) the problem of opinio juris circularity.  Finally, 
I discuss certain objections that arise in the context of applying the method 
of constructive interpretation in international law.  In the final part, I illus-
trate how constructive interpretation applies to the judicial assessment of
CIL identification.  I argue that the ICJ has already utilized, likely inadvert-
ently, constructive interpretation in reaching parts of its dispositive findings 
in the Nicaragua case, and I will dissect the Nicaragua judgment to estab-
lish this proposition.
Part I: Customary International Law
A. Theory and Jurisprudence
Customary law is the oldest source of all law, including international 
law.25 The early stages of international law’s development revealed the pro-
clivity of international actors to engage in perpetual activity in the form of 
shaping habits.  At the time, this concept of CIL as jus in gentium was origi-
nally developed through the Roman Empire’s dealings with foreign nations 
and shortly served as a facilitator to emerging nation states by providing a 
framework for the recognition of reciprocal legitimate expectations based on 
states’ consistent conduct.26 At this stage, customary law represented only 
consistent practice among states.
It was not until 1899 that the concept of opinio juris first emerged as the 
subjective element of CIL in expressing the “spirit of a nation.”27 François 
25. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 25 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 2008).
26. HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., 2014).
27. JÖRG KAMMERHOFER, UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A KELSENIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 534 (reprinted ed. 2012). Opinio juris is widely said to have been coined in 
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Gény, who coined the term opinio juris seu necessitatis, suggested that CIL 
requires practice to amount to the “exercise of a right of those who practice 
it.”28 The practice element of CIL also underwent significant change as the 
number of new nation states increased substantially after decolonization.29
The fact that the international community expanded from a handful of states 
to almost 200 states made it necessary to relax the originally far more strin-
gent participation requirement for the assessement of a general rule of inter-
national law from uniform to “widespread and representative.”30  Thus, de-
spite the long life of CIL, it was not until the 1960s that CIL began to
resemble what we largely understand it to be today.
CIL is also the most widely attacked source of international law.31  One 
of the first points of debate is an ontological critique, doubting that CIL re-
ally counts as law at all.  Certain international relations accounts view CIL 
norms as, at best, “regimes” that reflect conventions states follow with no 
attendant obligation to obey and thus largely dependent on political self-
interest.32 A wave of legal scholars echoed the view that CIL does not exer-
cise any “exogenous influence on state behavior” and cast doubt on whether 
CIL qualifies as law.33 H.L.A. Hart concludes that international law was not 
at a point that it could represent a full-fledged legal system due to the ab-
sence of a general “rule of recognition.”34 He argued that CIL’s foundational 
premise—that “states should behave as they have customarily behaved”—
was not a basic rule of recognition but simply “an empty repetition of the 
mere fact that the society concerned observes certain standards of conduct 
as obligatory rules.”35
In this environment of ontological doubt, and for the purpose of our 
conceptual taxonomy, scholars who accept the inclusion of CIL as a source 
of international law roughly form two groups. First, there are those who ad-
vocate that only state practice is relevant for CIL identification; second, 
there are those who stress the additional importance of the psychological 
FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF:
ESSAI CRITIQUE (2d ed. 1919).
28. GÉNY, supra note 27, at X.
29. KELSEN & TUCKER, supra note 17, at 452.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 
¶ 73 (Feb. 20).
31. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, Customary International Law in the 21st 
Century, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 197, 199 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. 
Bratspies eds., 2008) (summarizing the criticisms).
32. See Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic 
World, 36 INT’L. ORG. 299, 320 (1982).
33. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law 42–43
(2005).
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 226–31 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz 
eds., 3d ed. 2012).
35. Id. at 230.
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element of opinio juris, in varying degrees.36  Despite the theoretical debate 
on CIL’s nature and authority, states largely recognize CIL’s status in their 
international relations and their national legal orders.  For example, as early 
as the Paquete Habana case, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the exist-
ence of a CIL norm exempting coastal fishing vessels from capture during 
an armed conflict.37  At the same time, domestic courts are apprehensive 
about relying too much on CIL due to its alleged uncertain legal content and 
character.38 This critique focuses on the difficulty of delineating the content 
of CIL norms, as well as the difficulty of identifying the stage when a cer-
tain practice is no longer followed purely out of mere habit or convenience 
but out of legal obligation.
The ICJ Statute is the main instrument currently in place that provides 
guidance on how to identify a CIL norm.39 But the rules of Article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute reflect a world that is significantly different compared to today.  
Similar to how the increase of the number of states due to decolonization 
affected the formation and identification of CIL, the proliferation of non-
state actors in the international system caused the normative identification of 
rules and standards to appear somewhat outdated.  But, at the same time, 
these rules are sufficiently vague and flexible to avoid hindering, at least di-
rectly, the ability of states and other actors to creatively traverse the current 
lawmaking landscape.
The methodology of detecting a norm of CIL is a Pandora’s box of its 
own.  The content of CIL is considered more fluid and open to interpretation 
compared to other sources of international law.40 It is this quality that makes 
CIL norms more susceptible to indeterminacy and difficult to ascertain.41
How do we detect the existence and content of CIL rules?  An answer is to 
review how the ICJ approached this issue in the past.  The Court usually be-
gins by declaring the need to ascertain the two elements of state practice and 
opinio juris.42  Often though, as the Court moves to the analysis of the mer-
its, it refrains from performing this type of empirical test.  Instead of review-
ing state practice extensively in order to establish the sum of the actual con-
duct of states, it tends to quickly move into highlighting what constitutes 
36. ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 
(1971).
37. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 701–14 (1900) (surveying vari-
ous legal documents and opinions of jurists and authors which supported the existence of this 
exemption).
38. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729–30 (2004).
39. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38, ¶ 1(b) (defining 
“international custom” as “a general practice accepted as law”).
40. GIDEON BOAS, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 74 (2012).
41. Id.
42. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 
Rep. 3, ¶ 37 (Feb. 20).
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opinio juris.43 In other words, the ICJ sometimes quickly accepts the norm 
in question if it finds a widespread belief in its existence by deduction from 
the single sources that constitute opinio juris, such as statements, recogni-
tion contained in written documents of widespread acceptance, and multilat-
eral treaties with very broad participation.44
As early as the 1950s, the International Law Commission (the “ILC”)
was faced with the problem of the “ways and means for making the evi-
dence of customary law more readily available” in an effort to better eluci-
date the nature of CIL’s elements.45 Yet, to this day, the elements of CIL re-
main murky and conflicted as the ILC attempts to codify the CIL 
identification process.46 Anthony D’Amato argues that “the theory of custom 
must provide for change and adaptation in customary law, yet it must also 
establish enough stability so that it can exert a pressure on decisionmakers 
to refrain from certain contemplated actions that would violate the custom-
ary rule.”47 In a circular system, where states are simultaneously the law-
makers and the objects of legal constraint, striking this balance can prove 
particularly difficult.48 Sir Robert Jennings addresses the inherent tension in 
discerning CIL by arguing that what we understand as CIL today “is not on-
ly not customary law: it does not even faintly resemble a customary law.”49
He concludes that “perhaps it is time to face squarely the fact that the ortho-
dox tests of custom—practice and opinio juris—are often not only inade-
quate but even irrelevant for the identification of much new law today.”50
This climate of uncertainty set apart CIL theories in the so-called “old”
and “modern” CIL.  These two different schools of thought diverge on the 
questions of whether the two elements of CIL are mutually constitutive or if 
43. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 37 (June 27); see also Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta), 
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13, ¶ 27 (June 3); Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of Interna-
tional Law – 20 Years Later, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2009).
44. See Luigi Condorelli, Customary International Law: The Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow of General International Law, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
45. Int’l Law Comm’n, Ways and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary Inter-
national Law more Readily Available, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/6, at 4–5 (1949).
46. See Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission, INT’L LAW 
COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (describing the 
International Law Commission’s most recent efforts to establish the identification of CIL).
47. D’AMATO, supra note 36, at 274.
48. See Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: 
Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173, 176 (2010).
49. Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: TEACHING AND PRACTICE 3, 5 (Bin Cheng ed., 1982) (emphasis in original).
50. Id. at 71.
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either should predominate in the formation of CIL.51 Old CIL developed 
inductively from consistent widespread practice of states accepted as law.  It 
bases the expression of state consent for a rule on the states’ own actions 
and practices.52  A court should then examine if states undertake these prac-
tices as part of what they consider to be a legal duty in order to confirm or 
reject the existence of a CIL rule.  For “old CIL,” the two cumulative ele-
ments of state practice and opinio juris represent the conditio sine qua non
for the existence of a CIL rule.53 Modern CIL has a deductive character,54
relies primarily on opinio juris, and recognizes the potential influence in the 
process of non-state actors such as IOs and NGOs.55
The reasons behind the emergence of modern CIL theories vary, but
their roots probably lie with the decreased relevance of old CIL in today’s
international relations.  Both the increase of treaty law and the structural in-
ability of old CIL to address imminent contemporary problems such as cli-
mate change, terrorism, international financial regulation, proliferation of 
weapons, and systematic human rights violations pushed states to find alter-
native means to law-creation.56 The idea of modern CIL clashes with some 
traditional conceptions of CIL as “backward-looking and conservative,”57
giving it instead a more dynamic and aspirational quality.58  Combined with 
the incorporation and voicing of a wider set of actors and interests,59 modern 
CIL expands the scope of problems it is equipped to address.60 For “modern 
CIL,” the relevance of state practice is reduced “as the normativity of the 
obligation increases.”61 This means that CIL on highly normative issues 
51. Compare, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT’L
L. 146, 146–47 (1987), with Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
101, 102 (1987).
52. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in International Custom-
ary Law, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 279, 294 (2009).
53. See id.
54. See Simma & Alston, supra note 19, at 84.
55. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838–42
(1997); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Inter-
national Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 759 (2006).
56. Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law and Withdrawal 
Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 7 (2010).
57. Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary is Customary International 
Law?, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 909 (2013).
58. See Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” Internation-
al Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 23 (1965).
59. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 757.
60. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 
546–47 (1993).
61. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The 
Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 206 (2010).
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would become binding even under a lower threshold of state practice.62 The 
ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case is often considered a prime example of 
this approach to CIL.63 Before analyzing this decision, however, it is neces-
sary to dissect the two approaches of induction and deduction to identifying 
CIL.
A. Induction and Deduction as Methods of 
CIL Identification
Most theories and works of law require a methodology of gathering and 
stabilizing research findings, coupled with a set of criteria to determine their 
authoritativeness and validity.64 Under the inductive method, one attempts 
to induce CIL-making from “facts” of international life.65 The deductive 
method focuses on the abstract and deduces CIL norms from general propo-
sitions, usually deriving from an extra-legal, non-factual, often normative 
authority.66
The inductive method of CIL determination traces back to Comte’s
school of sociological positivism that based science on facts and awareness 
on experience. 67  Patterns of behavior in science were determined solely 
from abstraction of facts.  Due to the primarily prescriptive nature of the 
law,68 the inductive method was liberally transferred in order to base interna-
tional law on social reality69 using behavior as a means to reconcile law with 
fact.70 CIL formation under the inductive method is determined by collect-
ing and systematizing facts of state conduct—what we know as state prac-
tice.71 Within this school of thought, it comes as no surprise that authors 
62. See id.
63. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 37 (June 27); see also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶¶ 30–37 (Oct. 16); Legal Consequences for States of Continued Pres-
ence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Res-
olution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶¶ 30–31 (June 21).
64. See Kammerhofer, supra note 20, at 537.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. AUGUSTE COMTE, A GENERAL VIEW OF POSITIVISM 42 (J.H. Bridges trans., 
Routledge 1908) (1844).
68. See Craig Haney, Psychological and Legal Change: On the Limits of a Factual Ju-
risprudence, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 163 (1980) (distinguishing between prescriptive 
and descriptive disciplines).
69. See id. at 148 (describing the emergence in the nineteenth century of a concept of 
law whereby the law was viewed as an instrument for achieving positive goals).
70. Niels Petersen, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of 
State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 275, 301 (2007).
71. See, e.g., SIMMA, supra note 16, at 153, 216; S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 7) (holding that binding international law derives 
from the will of states as expressed via their actions and in conventions generally accepted as 
expressing principles of international law).
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such as Guggenheim and Kelsen proposed at times to dispense with opinio 
juris altogether as an element of CIL and rely only on state practice.72
Despite the application of a stricter inductive method in the early days 
of international law, the increased range of actors involved in CIL and their 
effect on its scope drove modern scholarship to utilize both an expansive in-
ductive methodology as well as a deductive methodology.73 In contrast to 
the inductive claim, the deductive process of international law is one “that 
begins with general statements of rules rather than particular instances of 
practice.”74 Early naturalist scholars were the first to introduce the deductive 
methodology into international law.  These accounts rely on more abstract 
normative principles, ethics, or morality as forming the backdrop of the in-
ternational legal order.75 Particular rules of CIL are deduced primarily from 
these principles as reflected in the conduct and discourse of international 
actors.  Nevertheless, positivist scholars also make use of the deductive 
methodology.  Kelsen contends that international norms are based on a 
“Grundnorm,” which forms the underlying basis of all other norms.76 To-
muschat advocates for a more comprehensive deductive approach toward 
CIL formation in which fundamental principles of common mankind—
values from which certain individual norms are deduced—govern a constitu-
tive international community.77
The ICJ also often follows a more deductive method in deriving CIL 
norms despite the inductive approach of its own sources under Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute.  In assessing Albania’s obligation to notify the international 
72. See Guggenheim, supra note 17, at 275–84; Kelsen, supra note 17, at 253. Both 
have, however, revised their opinion in later contributions. See KELSEN & TUCKER, supra 
note 17 (adding a second element to the definition of custom: that the individuals exercising 
the relevant action or abstention are convinced that they fulfill a duty or exercise a right); 
SIBERT, supra note 17.
73. See Bernhardt, supra note 20 (asserting that omissions by states are evidence of 
customary law and that any state agency can contribute to that state’s customary law); Virally, 
supra note 20, at 550 (demonstrating that a declaration of principle constitutes a method of 
establishing a rule of customary law); Guzman, supra note 20, at 124–25 (suggesting that dip-
lomatic correspondence, treaties, statements by heads of state, and domestic laws can serve to 
demonstrate state practice); see also Akehurst, supra note 20, at 4 (canvassing and criticizing 
the debate among scholars regarding whether a given category of state action merely confirms 
the existence of an already recognized custom or whether such state action is being employed 
by a state with a view to the establishment of custom). Although this broad approach to state 
practice is disputed, it reflects the majority of academic commentators and the legal jurispru-
dence. See Kammerhofer, supra note 20, at 525–30 (distinguishing between the subjective and 
objective elements, with respect to the formation of customary law, that are present in the 
practices of any state).
74. Simma & Alston, supra note 19, at 89.
75. See Tesón, supra note 20.
76. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1945).
77. Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 291.
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community about the existence of a minefield in its territorial waters in the 
Corfu Channel, the Court found that the obligation existed based:
[o]n certain general and well recognized principles, namely: ele-
mentary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace 
than in war; the principles of freedom of maritime communication; 
and every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to 
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.78
The Court deduced a prohibition from a greater principle—the “elementary 
considerations of humanity” —without scrutinizing further its role within 
the Article 38(1) sources of international law.79  In the Barcelona Traction
and Genocide Convention cases, the Court spoke of a distinct set of funda-
mental rights that lead to normative obligations, such as the prohibition of 
aggression, genocide, slavery, and racial discrimination.80 Under a deduc-
tive approach, the Court considered that these rights were of such funda-
mental and universal character that they formed the basis of further custom-
ary obligations, with little attention paid to how states previously acted in 
the face of these instances.
In this environment of methodological discord, I propose a middle 
ground approach, where value and fact are interwoven through constructive 
interpretation. At the heart of this interpretive thesis lies the idea that the in-
ternational community consists of a social system of ongoing, structured re-
lationships among the different actors within this system, as well as their 
perpetual interactions.81 Understanding the world as such an international 
community represents a conceptual shift from focusing on the given identity 
of actors to analyzing their functions.  This allows us to focus on the actors’
activities and effects as well as their specific ties to other actors at any point 
throughout the community’s legal history.82 This conceptual shift of inter-
pretive theory can incorporate the wider spectrum of state and non-state ac-
tors whose unaccounted practice and effect contribute to the current CIL in-
determinacy.
Constructive interpretation’s goal is to impose purpose on a practice in 
order to place it in the best possible light within the constraints of its histo-
ry.83 The constructive interpreter proposes a value for the practice by attach-
ing it to a set of goals or principles that it can be taken to express or exem-
78. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Apr. 9).
79. See SCHLÜTTER, supra note 14, at 141.
80. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Second 
Phase, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 34 (Feb. 5).
81. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
10–12 (1995).
82. See Jean L. Cohen, Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law, 18 
ETHICS & INT’L. AFF. 1, 1 (2004).
83. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 52.
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plify.84 Very often, competing interpretations will arise for the same prac-
tice, in which case the preferred interpretation is the one that proposes the 
most value for the practice ceteris paribus.85 Where a natural law theorist 
would look for a connection between law and morality, and a positivist 
would look to social facts, a theory of constructive interpretation contends 
that “propositions of law are true if they . . . provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice.”86
Part II: An Interpretive Theory of 
Customary International Law
A. Ronald Dworkin’s Interpretive Theory of International Law
Dworkin based his theory of interpretivism on an important principle 
that he calls “law as integrity.”87 “Law as integrity” establishes that the law 
ought to be created or interpreted in such a way to form one integral cohe-
sive whole.88 It does not accept that legal propositions are either backward-
looking descriptive reports of facts or forward-looking instrumental norma-
tive prescriptions.  Instead, by combining backward- and forward-looking 
elements in the analysis of legal propositions, “law as integrity” aims to in-
terpret these propositions as unfolding narratives.89
With integrity as the overriding principle across his theory, Dworkin 
made his first and only direct contribution to the international law debate in 
an article published posthumously, in which he argued that states have a 
prima facie obligation to follow international law.90  According to his inter-
national law theory, a coercive government has a duty to improve its own 
legitimacy.  This duty stems from what Dworkin introduces as the ‘principle 
of mitigation’ that demonstrates the “most general structural principle and 
interpretive background of international law.”91 According to this principle, 
all types of coercive government have a duty to pursue all possible and 
available means to mitigate the problems and failures of their system.92 To 
abide by this duty in the international system, states ought to establish laws 
in accordance with certain normative standards and improve their political 
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 225.
87. Id. at 166.
88. See id. at 118, 225–58, 410.
89. Id.
90. See generally Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 2 (2013).
91. Id. at 16, 19.
92. Id. at 19.
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legitimacy in their international relations.93  States therefore have an active 
duty to mitigate their coercive power and to “accept feasible and shared 
constraints” based on international law.94 Mitigation recognizes that sys-
tems of governance carry endemic insufficiencies and addresses how these 
systems can develop across time and through changing circumstances.
The principle of mitigation also imposes on states the obligation to 
compensate for their inability to solve global coordination problems alone.95
“[I]t follows that the general obligation to try to improve [the states’] politi-
cal legitimacy includes an obligation to try to improve the overall interna-
tional system.”96 For Dworkin, this obligation extends to cooperative du-
ties97 and is based on states rectifying the shortcomings of the Westphalian 
state-sovereignty system that they created.98 The principle of mitigation is 
what drives states out of the older notions of Westphalian sovereignty into a 
more dynamic and reciprocal conception of sovereignty that emphasizes 
protection for individuals, as well as cooperation and coordination in ad-
dressing the common interests of humanity.99
In sum, “law as integrity” serves as the backdrop of Dworkin’s cohesive 
jurisprudential theory. The principle of mitigation serves as a pragmatic ap-
proach to the entropy to which any closed system, such as the international 
system, is susceptible.100 These two principles form the cornerstone of a 
comprehensive interpretive theory of international law that Dworkin does 
not provide us with.  Nonetheless, Dworkin’s proposed theory of interna-
tional law offers some guiding principles to build a more comprehensive in-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Adam S. Chilton, A Reply to Dworkin’s New Theory of International Law, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 105, 105 (2013).
96. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 17.
97. Dworkin, supra note 90, at 17–18 (“Any state . . . improves its legitimacy when it 
promotes an effective international order that would prevent its own possible future degrada-
tion into tyranny.”). It does the same also when it can protect its people, on whom it has mo-
nopoly of force, from invasions of other peoples. Moreover, a state fails further if it discour-
ages cooperation to prevent economic, commercial, medical, or environmental disaster. As to 
cooperation in international law, see, for example, Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reis-
man, The Changing Structure of International Law: Unchanging Theory for Inquiry, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1965).
98. Dworkin, supra note 90, at 27.
99. Id. Insofar as the Westphalian system was the apex of state sovereignty, develop-
ments in international law, particularly in fields such as human rights, environmental law, and 
international criminal law, have been premised on the rise of a general duty of states to protect 
individuals. See Gianluigi Palombella, The Principles of International Law: Interpretivism 
and Its Judicial Consequences 7 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Studies, Research Paper 
No. RSCAS 2014/70, 2014).
100. See Joshua S. Martin et al., Removing the Entropy from the Definition of Entropy: 
Clarifying the Relationship Between Evolution, Entropy, and the Second Law of Thermody-
namics, EVOLUTION: EDUC. & OUTREACH, Oct. 31, 2013, https://evolution-
outreach.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1936-6434-6-30 (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
Fall 2018] Theory of Customary International Law 315
terpretive theory for understanding CIL.  In the following parts of the paper, 
I will fill in the gaps by unpacking some key ideas from Dworkin’s theory 
and apply them to the context of CIL identification.
B. A Comprehensive Interpretive Theory of 
Customary International Law
Unlike his international law theory that was brief and unfinished, 
Dworkin wrote systematically on the nature of law as a normative social 
practice often in response to the jurisprudential camps of positivism, natural 
law, pragmatism, and legal realism.101 For Dworkin, law is a constructive 
social phenomenon based on argumentative practice that “aims, in the inter-
pretive spirit, to lay principle over practice to show the best route to a better 
future, keeping the right faith with the past.”102 Actors involved in legal 
practice engage in constructive interpretation through which they test cer-
tain propositions that shed light on what this practice authorizes or regu-
lates.103 Oddly, even though most of the other jurisprudential schools trans-
cended into the international law debate, irrespective of their domestic 
origins,104 interpretivism has not received equal systematic attention.105 In 
order to understand how interpretivism can enhance CIL identification, it is 
first important to understand the interpretive process.
1. The Theoretical Basis of Interpretivism
Interpretivism is based on the idea that, even when parties agree on all 
empirical facts, they may still disagree on what the law and its contents 
101. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
JUSTICE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22, 26 (Bloomsbury Acad. 2013) 
(1977); DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 175.
102. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 13.
103. See id.
104. See Basak Çali, How Would You Like Your ‘Legal Change’ Done Today, Madam?,
ESIL (Inaugural Conference International Theory Agora Paper), http://esil-sedi.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Cali_0.pdf (last visited Oct.. 4, 2018); TERRY NARDIN, LAW,
MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1999). See generally Prosper Weil, Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L 413 (1983) (positivism); Terry 
Nardin, International Pluralism and the Rule of Law, 26 REV. INT’L STUD. 95 (2000) (same); 
Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302 (1999) (same); ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (pragmatism); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI,
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2d 
ed. 2006) (anti-foundationalism); D. KENNEDY, THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
(1986) (same).
105. See Basak Çali, On Interpretivism and International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 805,
805–06 (2009). But see John Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian 
Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85–128 (1996); Roberts, 
supra note 55.
316 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:301
are.106 According to interpretivism, this discrepancy exists because there is 
disagreement about which values lie at the core of the law.107 The values 
that lie at the core of the law are overarching propositions instead of merely 
valuable or guiding rules in specific contexts. For instance, specific interna-
tional humanitarian law (“IHL”) rules on precautions in attack are valuable 
to allow participants and non-participants in hostilities to operate more safe-
ly.108 A rule such as “those who plan or decide upon an attack shall do eve-
rything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither ci-
vilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but 
are military objectives” provides states with valuable guidance on target 
verification.109 But this specific rule stems from one of the core overarching 
values of IHL: the principle of distinction. Distinction establishes that the 
parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilians and combat-
ants in their treatment and attacks.110  For interpretivism, the values that are 
at the core of the law allow us to make better sense of the important parts of 
a practice.
The method we have for identifying both the values that are at the core 
of the law as well as the contents of the law is constructive interpretation.111
Constructive interpretation is “a matter of imposing purpose on an object in 
order to make the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is 
taken to belong.”112 It is a process that includes three separate stages: (1) pre-
interpretation, (2) interpretation, and (3) post-interpretation.113 The pre-
interpretive stage is the stage where the interpreter identifies a practice as 
well as any relevant standards, rules, and patterns that help determine the 
content of this practice.114 This stage requires a high degree of consensus re-
garding what counts as part of this practice.115 For instance, a practice such 
as “pawns may only be moved forward on the chessboard” meets the level 
of description and reasonable consensus required for a practice at the pre-
interpretive stage.116
The second stage is the interpretive stage, where the interpreter formu-
lates a general justification for the practice and its elements as identified 
106. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 146.
107. See id. at 141.
108. Precautions in Attack, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter5 (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
109. Rule 16. Target Verification, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule16 (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
110. See generally id. at 3; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN 
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW (1989).
111. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE, supra note 101, at 145–62.
112. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 62.
113. See id. at 66.
114. Id. at 65.
115. Id. at 62.
116. See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 66 (3d ed. 2013).
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during the pre-interpretive stage.117  Even though this justification does not 
need to accommodate all aspects of the practice identified at the pre-
interpretive stage, it must be sufficiently connected so as “to count as an in-
terpretation of [this practice] rather than the invention of something new.”118
At this stage there are three possible outcomes: (1) there are no eligible in-
terpretations; (2) there is only one eligible interpretation; or (3) there are 
many eligible interpretations due to unsettled or conflicting practice.119
Finally, the post-interpretive stage is the stage where the interpreter 
“adjusts his sense of what the practice ‘really’ requires so as better to serve 
the justification he accepts at the interpretive stage.”120 This is the stage 
where interpretation “ ‘folds back into itself.’ ”121 The interpreter decides to 
settle upon a particular meaning that makes the practice appear in the best 
light and thus establishes legal obligation.122 With the passing of time or the 
establishment of new practices, this meaning conversely becomes pre-
interpretive and the interpretive process may begin all over again.123 To as-
sist this analytical process, Dworkin borrows the concept of a “reflective 
equilibrium,” which also finds application in CIL identification.
2. The Concept of Reflective Equilibrium and Its CIL Application
Constructive interpretation employs the heuristic notions of “fit” (prac-
tice) and “justification” (purpose) to assess the relationship between a prac-
tice, on the one hand, and its purpose or value on the other.124 According to 
these notions, a purpose puts a practice in its best light when it fits and justi-
fies it better than any rival purpose.  A purpose fits a practice to the extent 
that it recommends that the practice [sic] exists or that it has the properties it 
has.125 Similarly, the purpose is justified insofar as it is a purpose worth 
pursuing.126 The purpose fits and justifies the practice in that without the 
purpose we would lose our claim to talk about the practice.127
Reflective equilibrium represents the state of affairs one reaches after 
having the opportunity to evaluate the notions of practice and purpose—in 
117. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 62.
118. Id. at 67.
119. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 771.
120. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 62.
121. GUEST, supra note 116, at 70 (quoting Dworkin).
122. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 256.
123. See GUEST, supra note 116, at 70.
124. See DWORKIN, supra note 101, at 169–71.
125. Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 22, 35 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
126. Id.
127. See Çali, supra note 105.
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other words, of fit and justification.128 The reflective process works back 
and forth between practice and purpose until the interpreter arrives at an in-
terpretation that is coherent and justified from both ends rather than priori-
tizing one description or value over another.129 Through this back and forth, 
which sometimes alters the conditions of the presumed practice and other 
times amends our justification of what constitutes purpose or principle, the 
interpreter eventually finds a description of the practice that expresses rea-
sonable conditions and principles to match our duly adjusted justifica-
tions.130  This coincidence of practice and purpose yields the equilibrium 
that represents a temporarily stable normative proposition.131 But this equi-
librium is not permanent.  The reflective process is ongoing, as conditions 
and judgments often change throughout time, prompting further examina-
tion and revision, which, in turn, initiates a new reflective process that may 
yield a different reflective equilibrium.132
The reflective equilibrium is often divided between a “narrow” and a 
“wide” reflective equilibrium.  Simply put, a narrow reflective equilibrium 
represents coherence between our considered judgments about a particular 
case or type of cases and our set of principles about this case. A wide reflec-
tive equilibrium adds a third dimension to the same process through a back-
drop of general principles and beliefs that are relevant to normative judg-
ment.  In international law, this set of principles includes general principles 
of international law as incorporated in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.133
These general principles of international law reflect the third dimension of a 
wide reflective equilibrium that allows us to better comprehend and assess 
CIL formation.
Even though, formalistically, general principles represent a distinct 
source of international law, they are propositions of law so fundamental that 
they are common to all, or almost all, legal systems.  General principles are 
not simply an integrative tool that can fill in gaps when there is no provision 
in an international treaty or CIL available for application in an international 
dispute.134 They are the basic, necessary rules of the international legal sys-
128. Rawls popularized the idea of reflective equilibrium that Nelson Goodman first 
introduced. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18, 40–44 (rev. ed. 1999); see NELSON 
GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST (1955).
129. See RAWLS, supra note 128, at 15–18.
130. See id. at 18–19; id. at 18 n.7 (adding that “[t]he process of mutual adjustment of 
principles and considered judgments is not peculiar to moral philosophy.”).
131. See John Mikhail, Rawls’ Concept of Reflective Equilibrium and Its Original Func-
tion in ‘A Theory of Justice,’ 3 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1, 12 (2010).
132. See RAWLS, supra note 128, at 18–19 (1971).
133. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 2, art. 38, ¶ 1(c).
134. See Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 764–83 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2006).
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tem that are often induced from the legal reasoning of judicial decisions.135
Principles such as laches, good faith, res judicata, equity, and self-
determination are foundational aspects of the international legal system.  
General principles are also embodied in treaties or become CIL.136 The posi-
tion of general principles as a separate source of international law does not 
affect their status as the principles and beliefs relevant to normative judg-
ment within the wide reflective equilibrium. The interpretive process of an 
emerging or established CIL norm in a wide reflective equilibrium is there-
fore one that best fits and justifies a practice in light of these general princi-
ples of international law, including the fundamental principles of interpre-
tivism: integrity and mitigation.
But how does this process apply to CIL identification?  To begin, imag-
ine an invented community of states where all its members follow a set of 
rules that they call ‘rules of courtesy.’137 States may say that these courtesy 
rules require financially developed states to provide developing states with
financial aid. Developed states then provide this type of aid to developing 
ones out of adherence to this courtesy.  For some time, these rules of courte-
sy exist but are neither questioned nor consciously accepted as legal duty.  
This may begin to change if some states realize that this courtesy serves a 
specific purpose, or that it enforces a particular principle.138 In other words, 
states may come to realize that these ‘rules of courtesy’ do not exist in a 
vacuum but instead reflect a certain purpose or principle and ought to be 
applied, extended, or modified in its light.139  At this point, the ‘rules of 
courtesy’ are no longer a mechanical or isolated act; they are given meaning 
and purpose and are reshaped accordingly.140
135. See Giorgio Gaja, General Principles of Law, in THE MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 370, 370–78 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2007). 
Instances where the Court has used general principles include: Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v 
Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 48 (Sept. 13); Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 
Rep. 4, ¶ 18 (Apr. 9); Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 47, ¶ 53 (July 13); Temple of Preah Vi-
hear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 26 (June 15); South West Africa 
(Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 88 (July 18); Legal Conse-
quences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16 
(June 21); Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, ¶ 23 (May 28); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 
1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 59 (Oct. 16).
136. See the Monetary Gold case where the ICJ stated, “to adjudicate upon the interna-
tional responsibility of Albania without her consent would run counter to a well-established 
principle of international law embodied in the Court’s Statute, namely, that the Court can only 
exercise jurisdiction over a State with its consent.” Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 
1943 (It. v. Fr., U.K., & U.S.), Preliminary Questions, 1954 I.C.J. Rep. 19, ¶ 32 (June 15).
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States could realize, for instance, that extending financial aid to devel-
oping states serves the purpose of establishing a democratic regime in these 
countries. This would cause states to try to better understand the practice of 
establishing a democratic regime in developing states as a conscious duty 
and to decipher the best way to make it happen. At this point, constructive 
interpretation decides not only why the rules of courtesy exist, but also what 
their content and form are.141 In this process, fit and justification play the 
role of descriptive practice and normative purpose respectively. This inter-
action between description and normativity is akin to the two elements of 
CIL. State practice and opinio juris largely take the form of descriptive and 
normative respectively and can be used as the means to flesh out the pro-
posed reflective process in CIL identification. But first, the notions of fit 
and justification must be elaborated on, specifically in connection to the two 
CIL elements.
This is not an entirely new attempt. Even though interpretive theory is 
underdeveloped in international law, some scholars now engage with it and, 
in that process, discuss the correlation between the two CIL elements and 
the notions of fit and justification. First, John Tasioulas builds on the inter-
pretive theory of law to balance the descriptive assessment of what the law 
is with the question of what the law should ethically reflect.142 In this pro-
cess, Tasioulas sees the dimension of fit as incorporating both state practice 
and opinio juris.143 Anthea Roberts introduces the idea of ‘modern custom,’
giving primary importance to opinio juris instead of giving largely equal 
weight to the CIL elements.144  Roberts suggests that, while state practice is 
integral to fit due to its descriptive nature, opinio juris can be both descrip-
tive and normative. This depends on whether it expresses lex lata in in-
stances of persistence of an existing CIL norm or lex ferenda in some in-
stances of a new CIL norm.145 In juxtaposition to these propositions, I will 
argue that the nature of the concepts of fit and justification within construc-
tive interpretation indicate whether they match with state practice, opinio 
juris, or both.  I will also argue that the distinction between lex lata and lex 
ferenda is not so fundamental to the interpretive process and that this reali-
zation instructs how we are to understand the dimensions of fit and justifica-
tion in CIL identification through this process.
On the one hand, the dimension of fit in interpretivism incorporates an 
articulation of descriptive practice.146 The establishment of a general justifi-
141. Id. at 48.
142. See Tasioulas, supra note 105.
143. Id. at 112.
144. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 758.
145. For a similar methodological disjunction of opinio juris, see Tasioulas, Comment, 
Opinio Juris and the Genesis of Custom: A Solution to the “Paradox,” 26 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 199, 202 (2007); see also Roberts, supra note 55, at 775.
146. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 65.
Fall 2018] Theory of Customary International Law 321
cation for this descriptive practice—the dimension of justification—comes 
as a separate step.147 This places the dimension of fit at the pre-interpretive 
stage of the interpretive process as it requires a degree of consensus regard-
ing the descriptive nature of the practice without necessitating a reason to 
justify the act beyond habitual or mechanical repetition. For CIL, this di-
mension of fit best mirrors what we have come to understand as general 
state practice.  The notions of “constant and uniform” practice stipulated in 
the Asylum Case,148 reflecting a “widespread and representative”149 level of 
international community consensus, mirror the requirements of description 
of the pre-interpretive stage in line with the purely descriptive nature of the 
dimension of fit.150
On the other hand, justification represents a normative account of a de-
scriptive practice leading to either one or multiple interpretations of this 
practice during the interpretive stage.  Unlike state practice, opinio juris re-
quires that “[t]he [s]tates concerned must . . . feel that they are conforming 
to what amounts to a legal obligation.”151 Opinio juris is not satisfied by the 
habitual character of an act, especially if this act is motivated merely by 
convenience, tradition, or courtesy—conditions that satisfy the dimension of 
fit.152 Instead, the normative character of opinio juris mirrors the dimension 
of justification that is limited to normative expressions of an identified de-
scriptive practice.153 Considering this distinction, general state practice and 
opinio juris belong to different notions and stages of the interpretive pro-
cess.
This distinction further elucidates the diminished importance of the lex 
lata-lex ferenda debate in the interpretive process. Justification, also in the 
CIL identification process, expresses some articulation of a duty or obliga-
tion of a legal nature.154 This articulation of legal duty may be either descrip-
147. Id. at 62.
148. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, ¶ 276 (Nov. 20).
149. Kelsen, supra note 17, at 445.
150. See 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE, supra note 25, at 29.
151. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 73
(Feb. 20).
152. Id.
153. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 62, 67.
154. See D’AMATO, supra note 36, at 49 (citing GÉNY, supra note 27, at 110)); see also
Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Refer-
ence to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369–70 (1999) (“A norm is a social rule 
that does not depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement [..] Norms may 
be independent of laws, as in the examples just given, or may overlap them; there are norms 
against stealing and lying, but also laws against these behaviors. The two kinds of rule rein-
force each other through differences in the mode of creation, the definition of the offense, the 
procedure for administering punishment, and the punishments themselves. Laws are promul-
gated by public institutions, such as legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts, after well-
defined deliberative procedures, and are enforced by the police power of the state, which ulti-
mately means by threat of violence. Norms are not necessarily promulgated at all. If they are, 
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tive or prescriptive in the sense that any given CIL norm may already exist 
(descriptive), may not exist (prescriptive), or its existence may be contested 
and uncertain (mix of descriptive and prescriptive). But the potential de-
scriptive character of justification does not equate it with fit. Rather, the dif-
ferentiating factor is that the nature of the dimension of justification is nor-
mative whether it describes or prescribes—in other words, whether it 
represents lex lata or lex ferenda. Thus, in the process of constructive inter-
pretation, opinio juris as the dimension of justification may represent lex 
lata, lex ferenda, or both.
The qualities of description and prescription are not incompatible with 
the notion of opinio juris as justification. The idea of a concept that is both 
descriptive and normative is not new.  Bernard Williams famously distin-
guished between “thin” and “thick” ethical concepts.155 “Thick concepts”
pierce through the distinction between description and normativity.156 The 
term represents a concept that includes both descriptive and normative con-
tent as it creates conditions for action and represents an action simultane-
ously.157 This allows the concept to straddle the descriptive and normative 
spheres.158 Through this quality, thick concepts are able to both convey a 
sense of how the world is as well as a sentiment and guide of how the world 
ought to be159 by imbuing fact with value.160
it is not by the state. Often a norm will result from (and crystallize) the gradual emergence of 
a consensus. Norms are enforced by internalized values, by refusals to interact with the of-
fender, by disapproval of his actions, and sometimes by private violence.”); cf. MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 56–57 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham 
Burchell trans., 2007). The common Foucauldian line is that “law is not what is important” in 
understanding modern governance. Instead, individuals are seen as basing their conduct on 
norms rather than formal law. Foucault himself said that “the role and function of the law 
therefore—the very operation of the law—is to codify a norm[.]” Id.
155. BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 140–42, 150–52
(1985).
156. The idea of ‘thick concepts’ is hotly debated in philosophy. While all philosophers 
accept the definition of a ‘thick concept’ as one that is simultaneously both ‘descriptive’ and 
‘evaluative,’ they disagree over the nature of the relationship between the two aspects of the 
concept. Their disagreement over the relationship—whether the ‘descriptive’ and the ‘evalua-
tive’ relate ‘conceptually’ or ‘conventionally’—has further implications in philosophy in de-
termining one’s positions on epistemological, metaphysical, and semantic issues in the debate 
over realism. For an excellent discussion of ‘thick concepts’ applied to legal judgments and 
objectivity in law, see Heidi Li Freeman, Legal Judgments, Thick Concepts, and Objectivity 
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the Harvard 
Law School Library); cf. Roberts, supra note 55, at 761–62.
157. See Joel M. Ngugi, Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an Enabling 
and Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 513 (2005).
158. A few standard examples of thick concepts are fairness, compassion, honesty, 
kindness, justice, selfishness, and cowardice. See Michael Smith, On the Nature and Signifi-
cance of the Distinction Between Thick and Thin Ethical Concepts, in THICK CONCEPTS 97
(Simon Kirchin ed., 2013).
159. WILLIAMS, supra note 155, at 140–42, 150–52.
160. See Freeman, supra note 156.
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A thicker conception of opinio juris as the dimension of justification 
not only evades the lex lata-lex ferenda debate but also opinio juris’ circu-
larity paradox.161 According to this paradox, opinio juris requires conscious 
action in accordance with preexisting law in the process of new normative 
formation.162 Yet many emerging CIL norms deviate from existing ones. In 
other words, a state needs to believe that what it is doing is already permis-
sible under CIL (lex lata), even though in practice it is not (lex ferenda).
Gény and Cheng offered the first proposal to solve this paradox.  They 
suggested that states acted in error during the formation of CIL, thinking 
that they were acting under a legal obligation that was in fact nonexistent.163
This solution, while in line with the traditional letter of opinio juris, is un-
satisfactory as it would base the entire CIL-making process on a “persistent 
misconception.”164  Kelsen also proposed a variation of this error theory, 
positing that states felt they were acting under a normative duty, which was 
not a legal norm but a sentiment of morality, equity, or justice.165  Later, he 
argued instead that it was sufficient for actors to “believe that they apply a 
norm, but they need not believe that it is a legal norm which they apply.”166
However, these proposed solutions to the CIL paradox in fact convolute fur-
ther the distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda in CIL identification. 
The irrelevance of the lex lata-lex ferenda binary through constructive inter-
pretation in CIL identification avoids altogether this circularity paradox.  
Instead, the inclusion of both descriptive and prescriptive qualities in the 
normative dimension of justification, as well as the specific relationship be-
tween a given descriptive practice and its justification, are what determine 
the reflective equilibrium.
3. The Relationship Between Fit and Justification
Even if we understand state practice to represent the dimension of fit 
and opinio juris to represent the dimension of justification, how does this 
help us in identifying a CIL norm?  The identification of a CIL norm hap-
pens through the inter se balancing of the dimensions of fit (state practice) 
and justification (opinio juris) that yields a reflective equilibrium represent-
ing a given CIL norm. This balancing may, at first, appear incommensurate 
as there is no set of specific metrics to quantify it.  The primary criticism 
against such presumed incommensurable concepts is that they are inherently 
subjective because they are not measurable or quantifiable.  However, the 
balancing process that yields the reflective equilibrium represents a state of 
“shared” or “mutual understanding,” which can escape the incommensura-
161. See Cheng, supra note 58; Kelsen, supra note 17, at 265.
162. Id.
163. Cheng, supra note 58.
164. Kelsen, supra note 17, at 265.
165. KELSEN, supra note 76, at 114.
166. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (1952).
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bility objection167 through the idea of “intersubjectivity”168 as represented in 
the theory of phenomenology.169  Husserl bases his theory of phenomenolo-
gy on the premise that individuals are surrounded by their own world expe-
rience, which constitutes the source of all human thought and knowledge. 
But individuals are also not isolated from one another and instead com-
municate intersubjectively.170 This intersubjective communication is the 
source of interpretive structure, which controls individuals’ experience in 
the world.171 These shared understandings allow for comprehension of 
events, facts, or entities that are not part of individuals’ immediate experi-
ence. Without this intersubjective process, we would be unable to form any 
kind of shared or stable conception of these events, facts, or entities sur-
rounding us.
Phenomenology places the individuals’ desire to create meaning from 
the momentary, abstract, and general experience at the forefront of human 
motivation.172 At the momentary level, individuals interpret sensory stimuli 
167. For more on this notion of “shared” or “mutual understanding,” see BARBARA 
ROGOFF, APPRENTICESHIP IN THINKING: COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL CONTEXT
(1990); RAGNAR ROMMETVEIT, ON MESSAGE STRUCTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY 
OF LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION (1974); Michael Tomasello & Malinda Carpenter, 
Shared Intentionality, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 121 (2007); Michael Tomasello et al., Un-
derstanding and Sharing Intentions: The Origins of Cultural Recognition, 28 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 675 (2005); Penelope Hubley & Colwyn Trevarthen, Sharing a Task in Infancy, 4 
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEV. 57 (1979).
168. For the primary theories of phenomenology, see EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN 
MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (Dorion Cairns trans., Kluwer 
Acad. 1988) (1950); EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE 
PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., Collier 1931) (1913); EDMUND HUSSERL, 2
IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTION (Richard Rojcewicz & 
André Schuwer trans., Kluwer Acad. 1989) (1952) [hereinafter HUSSERL, PHENOMENOLOGY 
OF CONSTITUTION]; EDMUND HUSSERL, 1 LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (Dermot Moran ed., J. 
N. Findlay trans., Routledge 2001) (1970) [hereinafter HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS];
EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL 
PHENOMENOLOGY (David Carr trans., Nw. Univ. Press 1970) (1954); MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Donald. A. Landes trans., Routledge 2012) 
(1945). For more general theories outside the scope of this argument, see MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962); MARTIN 
HEIDEGGER, THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY (Albert Hofstadter trans., rev. ed. 
1988).
169. In international legal theory, ‘phenomenology’ often means something other than it 
does in the continental philosophical tradition to which I wish to associate my approach. For 
international legal theory, see KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 104, at 376; cf. Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (2004).
170. See HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 168, at 182–86.
171. See Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the 
Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 328 
(2002).
172. See RUDOLF BERNET ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERLIAN 
PHENOMENOLOGY 115–40 (1993); HUSSERL , PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTION, supra
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as intersubjectively discovered entities that help them make sense of the sur-
rounding world.  At the abstract level, they turn these momentary interpreta-
tions into meaningful generalities. This is what yields a basic common un-
derstanding of certain concepts among people despite inherent perception 
biases and gaps. Intersubjectivity allows us to have at least a basic common 
conception of what is meant by a table, or science, or ancient Athens when 
we speak of them or what morality or fairness generally entail.173 The bal-
ance of the reflective equilibrium thus represents a state of moving from ini-
tial disagreement in some of our considered judgments to agreement and 
consensus that demonstrates a recognizable kind of objectivity through in-
tersubjective agreement.174
The balance between the dimensions of fit and justification will vary 
according to the strength of each dimension. Inadequacies of fit will count 
against an interpretation on the dimension of justification and, in turn, “de-
fects of fit may be compensated . . . if the principles of that interpretation 
are particularly attractive.”175 In CIL, one is then to proceed with reflectively 
interpreting general state practice and opinio juris to reach the most coher-
ent interpretation.  Though inadequacies of one element will count against 
the other, the two elements are not interchangeable.176 The reflective process 
revises our interpretation of the dimensions of fit and justification back and 
forth until we manage to render our interpretation justified and coherent 
from both ends.177 This balance is then constantly affected by new practice 
and opinio juris subject to new interpretive processes and even new system-
ic principles as international law evolves.
Consider, for instance, the rule on the prohibition of the use of force.  
Engaging in humanitarian intervention, or the Responsibility to Protect (the 
“R2P”), would normally be understood as a breach of the existing CIL rule 
on non-intervention unless there is a strong and consistent practice and 
opinio juris to suggest otherwise.178 While such prima facie breaches of CIL 
may indeed be interpreted qua breaches, they may also, under a different 
interpretation, create new CIL rules.  For instance, the invocation by the 
United Nations Security Council (the “UNSC”) of the doctrine of R2P in the 
case of Libya179 may indicate: (1) the emergence of a new right for individu-
al or collective intervention in third states in cases of systematic human 
note 168, at 101–10; HUSSERL, LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 168, at 155–89. This 
sociological level of meaning is explored in ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE 
SOCIAL WORLD 45–96 (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967).
173. See SCHUTZ, supra note 172, at 45–96.
174. Norman Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 
J. PHIL. 256, 274–76 (1979).
175. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 246–47.
176. See Kirgis, supra note 51, at 149.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. S.C. Res. 2095 (Mar. 14, 2013).
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rights abuses; (2) the emergence of a new duty for individual or collective 
intervention into third states in cases of systematic human rights abuses; or 
(3) a singular breach of the principles of non-intervention and prohibition of 
use of force.  Multiple interpretations allow us to assess which one best jus-
tifies the conflicting practice without needing to employ either a cumulative 
or a trade-off methodology between the two CIL elements.180
4. Certain Objections to the Application of 
Interpretivism in International Law
A common objection against the theory of interpretivism in internation-
al law is premised on the idea that interpretivism requires the existence of a 
political community, and the decentralized international system is not such a 
community.181 To understand this critique, we must first unpack it. For in-
terpretivism to apply as a social practice in law, it requires coherence in how 
the law that is created and applied treats society’s members.182 This is the 
idea of “law as integrity.” The application of the principle of integrity into 
domestic law is based on the idea that law operates within a political com-
munity personified and manifested by the state.183 This political community 
is a distinct moral agent not only with principles that are separate from those 
of the officials who act in the community’s name,184 but also an agent with 
reciprocal rights and obligations among itself and its members.185 When dis-
sected, this objection effectively becomes a twofold argument. First, inter-
national law regulates multiple political communities and not one interna-
tional community.186 Second, even if there is indeed one international 
community, there are no common values and goals that underlie this inter-
national community.187
(a)  There is no Single International Community
For Dworkin, the community in which constructive interpretation has 
its place is a “true community.”188 The four conditions of this true communi-
ty are those of reciprocity, responsibility, general concern, and equal con-
cern.189 Reciprocity reflects the notion that, if some do not accept their re-
sponsibility toward one, then that one may also abandon its responsibility 
180. See Roberts, supra note 55, at 776.
181. See Çali, supra note 105, at 817.
182. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 167.
183. Id. at 167–72.
184. Id. at 172.
185. See George C. Christie, Dworkin’s “Empire,” 36 DUKE L.J. 157 (1987).
186. See Çali, supra note 105, at 818.
187. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 185.
188. Id. at 201–02.
189. Id.
Fall 2018] Theory of Customary International Law 327
toward the rest. Community members ought to manifest an attitude of recip-
rocal responsibility; in other words, they have to see and believe that they 
are responsible to each other. Members of this community have a general 
concern for one another, which constitutes the source of reciprocal respon-
sibilities.  Finally, a true community is conceptually egalitarian in the sense 
that its members have equal standing among the group and treat each other 
as carrying the same endemic value.190 Even though different or hierarchical 
roles may exist within the community, these roles are justified by the benefit 
they produce for each member equally and for the community as a whole. 
The outcome of this “true community” is a set of rights and obligations aris-
ing out of collective community decisions that bind the members.
The international community increasingly resembles this idea of a “true 
community.” While states remain powerful and relevant actors in interna-
tional law, they no longer have the unitary authority of traditional interna-
tional law. More specifically to CIL, a periphery of non-state actors, includ-
ing international organizations (“IO”), intergovernmental organizations 
(“IGO”), and non-governmental organizations (“NGO”), increasingly influ-
ence state action, resulting in a distinct, measurable impact on international 
relations and law.191 Though sovereignty represented a hard shell in the early 
days of international law development, it significantly transformed over 
time.192 Chayes and Chayes argue that sovereignty no longer represents the 
freedom of states to act entirely independently and out of self-interest. It is 
rather contingent upon membership and status within international relations 
regimes and the international system as a whole.193 In these various regimes, 
a much wider spectrum of actors is involved in reciprocal relations, making 
the international system increasingly more egalitarian.
In international legislative action, individual or collective state action 
was generally presumed as the only relevant metric.194 But the more com-
plex and connected the international community becomes, the more non-
state actors affect the development and determination of international law.195
190. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 6 (2000); see also DWORKIN, supra note 
21, at 179.
191. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Chal-
lenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L. L. 211, 221–22 (1991); Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on 
the Work of Its Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017).
192. This is evident from the very titles of recent books in the field. See, e.g.,
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION (Neil Walker ed., 2003); RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
END OF WESTPHALIA? (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008); SOVEREIGNTY IN FRAGMENTS: THE 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT (Hent Kalmo & Quentin Skinner 
eds., 2010).
193. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995).
194. See John King Gamble & Charlotte Ku, International Law–New Actors and New 
Technologies: Center Stage for NGOs?, 31 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 221, 243–44 (2000).
195. See Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579, 
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States today are only one relevant actor and factor in the lawmaking pro-
cess, with IOs, IGOs, NGOs, and other non-state actors also participating.196
Although there is little doubt about the persisting relevance of states, there is 
increasing doubt about how dominant they will be going forward.  Refer-
ence to states as the constituents of this international community does not 
preclude other actors from either being part of this community or engaging 
in its normative development.197
The non-state actors that emerge within states either have an effective 
relationship with central domestic governing actors or are in opposition to 
them, but in either case, they wield significant power.198 These dynamics 
foster an environment of reciprocal responsibility and equal concern toward 
actors and the international community. Non-state actors influence state be-
havior domestically by working together with or applying pressure on gov-
ernmental and transgovernmental decisionmaking.199 They also work col-
lectively with governments by participating in international forums and 
negotiations, as well as treaty- and resolution-drafting.200  Some scholars go 
as far as to argue that non-state actors deserve a more official seat at the in-
ternational lawmaking table.201 This type of an international community re-
sembles a wider network of relationships between states and non-state ac-
tors coming together collectively, or in smaller sub-networks, to produce 
political as well as normative and legislative practices and discourse in such 
a way as to increase reciprocal responsibility.202
595 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the 
“Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 959–60 (1996).
196. See PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: LAND AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND OCEANIA 18 (Toon van Meijl & Franz von Benda-
Beckmann eds., 1999).
197. See Nicholas Tsagourias, The Will of the International Community as a Normative 
Source of International Law, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 97, 102 
(Ige F. Dekker & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004).
198. See JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOSCLEROSIS: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT (1994).
199. See, e.g., Christine Walsh, The Constitutionality of State and Local Governments’
Response to Apartheid: Divestment Legislation, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 763, 795 (1985).
200. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross played a pivotal role in 
the initiation and negotiation of the Ottawa convention banning land mines. See Kenneth An-
derson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L.
91 (2000).
201. See Gunning, supra note 191, at 227–34. This has been met with pushback. See, 
e.g., Spiro, supra note 195, at 962–67.
202. See BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS,
DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 15 (Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 
1995); see ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 8, 
39, 42 (1977); Abraham L. Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legiti-
macy, and Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244, 248 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
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The world through this prism incorporates the characteristics of a true 
community consisting of a web of state and non-state actors. Despite the 
traditional hierarchical and largely unequal conception of the international 
system, when we switch our lens to seeing the world as a web, we notice 
that these networks of actors, within their internal and external structures 
and dynamics, operate primarily in egalitarian terms.203 In their smaller for-
mations, they usually come together more actively regarding a specific issue 
of interest and establish relationships in order to advocate and achieve their 
cause through international legislative means.204 This creates not only recip-
rocal obligations but also a sense of equal concern for other actors and the 
community as a whole. The larger international community network prolif-
erates into small sub-networks for the purpose of promoting a specific norm, 
but also develops standing structures that have larger purposes and agendas 
beyond the simple promotion, diffusion, and adoption of one norm.205 These 
networks are not only a depiction of actors in international relations, but
form the international legal community in which we can apply the interpre-
tive framework of analysis.206
(b)  There Are No Common Values Within the 
International Community
Another critique of applying interpretivism to international law ques-
tions is whether the international community is capable of forming its own 
distinct governing principles and values due to its innate decentralized na-
ture. Interpretivism in international law is based on the idea that the ultimate 
justification of the states’ coercive power “arises not just within each of the 
sovereign states who are members of the Westphalian system but also about 
the system itself: that is, about each state’s decision to respect the principles 
Pollack eds., 2013); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 544 (Walter 
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002); Kal Raustiala, The Rise of Transnational Networks Conference 
November 7, 2008: Transnational Networks: Past and Present, 43 INT’L LAW. 205, 206 
(2009); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 (2004).
203. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB: STRATEGIES OF 
CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 24, 66 (2017); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Public Participa-
tion in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation, 56 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 961, 964–65 (2004).
204. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovern-
mental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2002); New-
man & Zaring, supra note 202, at 253.
205. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Po-
litical Change, 52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 899 (1998).
206. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
HOW WE USE IT 150 (1995); Math Noortmann, Transnational Law: Philip Jessup’s Legacy 
and Beyond, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 63 (Math Noortmann et al. 
eds., 2015).
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of that system.”207 This system, represented by the international community, 
is already ruled by a set of common principles that form the ground for mu-
tual rights and obligations. These principles do not require the explicit con-
sent of all members but instead arise from the historical fact that the interna-
tional community adopted them.208 Members of the international communi-
community accept that their rights and obligations are not exhausted by the 
specific decisions made by the governing actors but instead depend on the 
more general principles these decisions presuppose and uphold.209 Indeed, 
the international system we have today, not unlike domestic systems, is 
premised on such a set of goals and principles. These include the founda-
tional goals of maintenance of international peace and security210 and the 
development of friendly relations and cooperation between nations.211 They 
also include common, generally-accepted principles such as the principles 
of legality,212 sovereign equality,213 integrity, and mitigation.214 These so-
called general principles of international law are the common values within 
the international system that make the method of constructive interpretation 
conducive to international law.
So, what would the method of constructive interpretation look like in 
action for the judicial identification of CIL norms within the international 
community? In the remainder of this Article, I argue that the ICJ already uti-
lized, though inadvertently, constructive interpretation in reaching parts of 
its dispositive findings in the Nicaragua case.215
Part III: The Interpretive Theory in Action: 
The Nicaragua Case Revisited
The case Nicaragua v. United States is one of the most noteworthy cas-
es decided by the ICJ. It continues to shed light upon several central interna-
tional law issues, including the sources of international law and the law on 
the use of force.  However, the methodology adopted by the Court in ad-
dressing the question of non-intervention is subject to ample criticism.  
207. Dworkin, supra note 90, at 16–17.
208. See id. at 15.
209. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 211.
210. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
211. See, e.g., id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
212. See, e.g., Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 22, ¶ 1, 24, ¶¶ 1–2, July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
213. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1; EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY 
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 46 (2014).
214. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 90, at 17 (“People around the world believe that they 
have—and they do have—a moral responsibility to help to protect people in other nations 
from war crimes, genocide and other violation of human rights.”).
215. For a similar analysis of the judgment of the Nicaragua case with a different aim, 
see Tasioulas, supra note 105.
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Most saw the Nicaragua decision as an arbitrary departure from the tradi-
tional framework the Court used to establish CIL rules.216 Hilary Charles-
worth notes:
[T]he Nicaragua understanding of customary international law can 
be criticized for its obscurity. While retaining the traditional lan-
guage of the elements of customary international law, the Court 
does not offer any clear definition of these elements and in fact 
seems to move away from much of the accepted jurisprudence in 
the area.217
Sir Robert Jennings notably observed in the context of the Nicaragua case 
that “we cannot reasonably expect to get very far if we try to rationalize the 
law of today solely in the language of Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.”218 Prosper Weil argued that Nicaragua’s “relative 
normativity” threatened to “destabilize the whole international normative 
system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose.”219
It would shatter the raison d’être of the international law construct and its 
“essential features”: voluntarism, ideological neutrality, and, most im-
portantly, positivism.220
In this part of the Article, I argue against the popular premise that the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua case departed from its traditional method in identify-
ing CIL in accordance with its Statute.221 Instead, if we analyze the Court’s
approach in Nicaragua through the interpretive lens, we will find that the 
Court retained its position that state practice and opinion juris are constitu-
tive of CIL, but reshuffled the relationship between these elements. Because 
the Court did not depart from the requirements of general state practice and 
opinio juris reflected in its Statute, its findings should not be rejected as ar-
bitrary or indeterminate. Instead, we can establish determinacy and absence 
216. See H.C.M. Charlesworth, Customary International Law and the Nicaragua Case,
11 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 27 (1991); Jonathan I. Charney, Customary International Law in 
the Nicaragua Case Judgment on the Merits, 1 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 16, 17 (1988); see also
Jennings, supra note 49, at 3, 9; Tomuschat, supra note 20, at 303 (1993) (arguing a more 
idealistic approach); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 419–23 (1983).
217. Charlesworth, supra note 216, at 27.
218. Jennings, supra note 49, at 9.
219. Weil, supra note 216, at 423.
220. Id. at 418, 420–21.
221. See Charlesworth, supra note 216, at 30 (arguing the court in the Nicaragua case 
can be seen as allowing the existence of different sets of customs). Tasioulas was the first one 
to take up this task. See generally Tasioulas, supra note 105 (arguing in favor of relative nor-
mativity under an interpretive approach by using Kirgis’ sliding scale theory). However, in 
my opinion, Tasioulas fell short from offering a comprehensive CIL theory under the interpre-
tive premise, which would more concretely put the Nicaragua Judgment in its best light 
against its critics and in line with international law developments. I wish to take up this task in 
the present work.
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of arbitrariness by viewing the Court’s decision as engaging in the interpre-
tive process of identifying CIL norms.
A. The Nicaragua Case
The dispute before the ICJ was based on Nicaragua’s claim that the 
United States was responsible for the activities of the contras forces fighting 
to overthrow the Sandinista government, including attacks on Nicaraguan 
territory, waters, ports, and oil installations.222 Before the Court could estab-
lish jurisdiction to hear the dispute, it had to assess the United States’ reser-
vation to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36(2) of the 
ICJ Statute for multilateral treaties.223
The “Vandenberg” reservation, as it became known, was intended to ex-
clude any disputes from the jurisdiction of the Court that arose under a mul-
tilateral treaty unless the United States specially agreed to the jurisdiction of 
the Court or all the parties to the treaty affected by the decision were also 
parties to the case before the Court.224  The United States filed preliminary 
objections to the dispute, invoking this reservation in order to resist the ju-
risdiction of the Court on the grounds that Nicaragua’s application for relief 
relied, in part, on four multilateral treaties to which both Nicaragua and the 
United States were party: (1) the United Nations Charter, (2) the Charter of 
the Organization of American States, (3) the Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States of 1933, and (4) the Havana Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife of 1928.225 The Court 
found in favor of the United States on this argument because three other 
states—Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras—would be affected by the 
Court’s decision even though they were not parties to the dispute before the 
Court.226 Thus, the conventional rules regulating the use of force under the 
above conventions were inapplicable qua conventional rules.
Nicaragua also based its application for relief on parallel claims under 
CIL, and the Court was prepared to grant jurisdiction and adjudicate on this 
basis.227 In response, the United States argued that the United Nations Char-
ter provisions on the use of force “subsume and supervene related principles 
of customary and general international law,”228 and the reservation had the 
222. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 15 (June 27).
223. See id. ¶ 37.
224. See id. ¶ 42.
225. See id. ¶ 15.
226. See id. ¶ 292; El Salvador’s application to intervene in the jurisdiction phase of the 
case was rejected on the grounds that the Court was not then dealing with the merits of the 
case. El Salvador did not make a further application to intervene at the merits phase of the 
proceedings. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 291.
227. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 292.
228. Id. ¶ 173.
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effect to exclude “any rule of customary international law the content of 
which is also the subject of a provision in those multilateral treaties.”229 The 
Court rejected this argument, stipulating that not all of the relevant CIL 
rules were identical to those in treaty230 and, regardless, that a treaty rule and 
a CIL rule may exist in parallel without the applicability of one barring the 
applicability of the other.231 Based on this reasoning, the Court held, inter 
alia, that the United States breached its CIL obligations to Nicaragua to not 
use force against another state and to not interfere in the domestic affairs of 
another state.232
The “flexible” approach the Court took toward the requirements for the 
CIL declaration of these norms became a point of contestation.  This “flexi-
bility” differed in three main ways from classical conceptions of how CIL 
rules are identified.  First, the Court held that (absolute) uniformity of gen-
eral practice is not a requirement for a CIL rule to emerge. On the contrary, 
practice that deviates from a generally uniform practice ought to be inter-
preted as a breach of a rule rather than a bar to its crystallization as CIL.233
This was viewed as a reduction in the amount of general practice that the 
Court required for the identification of a CIL norm. Second, the Court wid-
ened the realm of sources from which opinio juris can be inferred. It derived 
opinio juris not only from states’ declarative belief that they are complying 
with a rule, but also from their voting patterns within multilateral forums 
such as the United Nations General Assembly (the “UNGA”).234 Finally, 
the Court recognized that CIL rules retain their independent and autono-
mous nature after they are embodied in multilateral treaties.235 In the fol-
lowing pages, I will examine primarily the first two “innovations” of the 
Court under the interpretive CIL claim.
B. Customary International Law Issues in the Nicaragua Case
The ICJ in Nicaragua addressed CIL in various instances.  First, the 
Court confirmed the method by which to establish a CIL rule by referring to 
its decision in the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta) case:
229. Id.
230. See id. ¶ 174.
231. See id. ¶¶ 177–78 (establishing the reasons for the separate existence of such 
norms) (“(i) such rules may differ in regard to their applicability: in a legal dispute affecting 
two states, one may argue that the applicability of a treaty rule to its own conduct depends on 
the other State’s conduct in respect of the application of other rules, on other subjects, also 
contained in the treaty; and (ii) though indistinguishable as a matter of content, such rules may 
be differentiated by their methods of interpretation and application.”).
232. See id. ¶ 292.
233. See id. ¶ 186.
234. See id. ¶ 188.
235. See id. ¶ 174.
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It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international 
law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio 
juris of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an 
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from 
custom, or indeed in developing them.236
The Court supported this methodological approach by citing to Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute, requiring it to apply “international custom as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law”237 without disregarding “the essential role 
played by general practice. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence 
of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.”238
This last quote provides the first figment of the purported change in the 
relationship between the two elements of CIL the ICJ put forward in the 
Nicaragua case.  Though not explicitly prescribed anywhere, the traditional 
CIL identification often began with state practice later confirmed by opinio 
juris. In other words, the first necessary condition to establish was state 
practice, later followed by a finding of opinio juris, for a norm to become a 
rule of CIL.239 The Nicaragua case inverted this anecdotal process of CIL 
identification.240 In the Nicaragua case, opinio juris is first established as, 
for instance, embodied in a UNGA Resolution, and then general state prac-
tice is used to confirm the CIL character of said opinio juris declaration.241
For some, this downgraded the importance of general state practice in CIL 
identification and increased the significance of opinio juris.242
Second, the ICJ addressed the problem of inconsistency between prac-
tice and opinio juris by partly redefining the two concepts.  Starting with the 
element of general state practice, it found:
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application 
of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that 
States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the 
use of force or from intervention in each other’s internal affairs.  
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as cus-
tomary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule.  In order to deduce the existence of cus-
tomary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of 
236. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27
(Feb. 20).
237. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 184.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Christian Dahlman, The Function of Opinio Juris in Customary Interna-
tional Law, 81 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 327, 329–30 (2012).
240. See O. Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 531, 532 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
241. Id. at 532; D’Amato, supra note 51, at 101–02.
242. See Schachter, supra note 240, at 532.
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States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that in-
stances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should gen-
erally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications 
of the recognition of a new rule.243
The Court thus not only significantly lowered the threshold of general state 
practice to reach the requisite level of CIL here, but also recognized that it is 
sufficient for general state practice to be consistent with statements of rules 
insofar as contrary practice is treated as “breaches of that rule, not as indica-
tions of the recognition of a new rule.”244 Traditionally, evidence of incon-
sistent action was treated as a hurdle and threat to CIL identification. For 
instance, in earlier jurisprudence the Court insisted on virtually uniform 
practice undertaken in a manner that demonstrates general recognition of the 
legal obligation for the identification of CIL. The Court’s turn in the treat-
ment of inconsistent practice largely redefined what amounts to general 
state practice as an element of CIL.
In sum, what the Court did so far is to maintain its approach that CIL 
derives from the two elements of general practice and opinio juris, but to 
invert the analytical order and to lower the threshold for general state prac-
tice in terms of uniformity and conformity compared to its earlier jurispru-
dence.245 The Court’s reformulated analysis of the CIL elements sets the 
backdrop of the interpretive process this Article identifies.
C. Uncovering the Interpretive Process in the Nicaragua Case
In what is perhaps the most significant part of the Nicaragua judgment 
for the purposes of this Article, the Court discussed the establishment of the 
rule on non-intervention as CIL.246 In this assessment, the Court argued that 
the subjective element of opinio juris was “backed by established and sub-
stantial practice” without offering concrete examples of this practice. 247 At 
the same time, the Court addressed the practice of foreign intervention that 
was contrary to the asserted rule by acknowledging generally “in recent 
years a number of instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces 
opposed to the government of another State.”248 The Court then switched 
and went on to suggest that,
[i]t has to consider whether there might be indications of a practice 
illustrative of belief in a kind of general right for States to inter-
vene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support 
243. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186.
244. Id.; Roberts, supra note 55, at 765.
245. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 74
(Feb. 20).
246. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 205–07.
247. Id.
248. Id. ¶ 206.
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of an internal opposition in another State . . . For such a general 
right to come into existence would involve a fundamental modifica-
tion of the customary law principle of non-intervention.249
After concluding that “states have not justified their conduct by reference to 
a new right of intervention or a new exception to the principle of its prohibi-
tion,”250 the Court found that “no such general right of intervention, in sup-
port of an opposition within another State, exists in contemporary interna-
tional law.”251
The Court has been criticized on the ground that it thus established a 
CIL rule of non-intervention by disproving the existence of a rule allowing 
for intervention. Charlesworth labels this a ‘novel technique’ that the Court 
adopts, where it proves a rule of CIL by disproving the existence of an op-
posite rule.252 Charlesworth contends that such a method of formal logic is 
too simplistic in legal analysis, as with legal propositions it is possible to 
establish the absence of a rule without needing to prove the existence of the 
contrary rule. Under strict voluntarism, for instance, in the absence of a rule 
prohibiting certain conduct, a state may act freely.253 Absence of a rule does 
not necessarily imply the opposite.254
I want to offer a different approach and argue that what the ICJ did here 
instead was to undergo an analysis akin to the interpretive process. In sum, 
the Court first defined the principle of non-intervention as “the right of eve-
ry sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference.”255 The 
Court then asked itself one primary question and subsequently juxtaposed 
two different possible interpretations to assess. The Court offered two inter-
pretations to answer the following question: Is there a CIL norm of non-
intervention? Interpretation 1 (“INT1”): There is a CIL norm that establish-
es non-intervention; Interpretation 2 (“INT2”): There is a CIL norm that al-
lows foreign intervention. This distinction between potential interpretations 
reflects the second stage of the interpretive process, where the interpreter 
formulates a general justification for a specific set of data identified at the 
pre-interpretive stage.256 To determine the best interpretation, the Court then 
revised the dimensions of fit (state practice) and justification (opinio juris)
back and forth until it rendered its interpretation justified and coherent from 
both ends and reached a reflective equilibrium.257
249. Id.
250. Id. ¶ 207.
251. Id. ¶ 208.
252. Charlesworth, supra note 216, at 25.
253. See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 18 (Sept. 
7).
254. Charlesworth, supra note 216, at 25.
255. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202.
256. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 62.
257. Id. at 285.
Fall 2018] Theory of Customary International Law 337
This process should be dissected in detail from the beginning. In first 
assessing the dimension of fit, the Court asked what practice attaches to the 
exact content of the principle of non-intervention.258 To find the practice, the 
Court first accepted that a rule of non-intervention “in view of the generally 
accepted formulations”259 forbids “all States or groups of States to intervene 
directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other States” in a 
coercive manner.260 The Court attached non-intervention to the wider set of 
international law principles related to the sovereign equality of states.261 A
prohibited intervention, then, must be one that breaches what the principle 
of state sovereignty is set to protect, such as matters that include “the choice 
of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of 
foreign policy.”262 In further assessing the dimension of fit, the Court found
that, outside of the context of decolonization, there was “in recent years a 
number of instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces opposed 
to the government of another State.”263 Considering the existence of this op-
posite practice, the Court put forward a different interpretation of non-
intervention and asked whether this practice could be better understood as 
an indication “of belief in a kind of general right for States to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of an internal 
opposition in another State.”264
After establishing these two possible practices, the Court assessed the 
dimension of justification within the two possible interpretations. For INT1, 
suggesting that there is a CIL norm that establishes non-intervention, the 
Court finds ample support in justification. This includes the UNGA Decla-
ration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States; the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their In-
dependence and Sovereignty; the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States and the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention; 
Resolutions of the Organization of American States General Assembly; as 
well as the Helsinki Final Act.265
To assess INT2, suggesting the existence of a CIL norm that allows for-
eign intervention, the Court looked for instances where states relied on a 
“novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle” of non-
intervention.266 In search of such justifications, the Court focused on the 
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United States and Nicaragua as the two relevant parties in this dispute. Re-
garding the United States, the Court found that, on occasion, it stated as rea-
sons for intervention in the affairs of third states “the domestic policies of 
that country, its ideology, the level of its armaments, or the direction of its 
foreign policy.”267 The United States also largely relied on “classic” justifi-
cations for intervention—even in Nicaragua—such as collective self-
defense.268 Similarly, the Court found that Nicaragua also expressed sympa-
thy and solidarity with the opposition in neighboring states such as El Sal-
vador, but always in political terms and not as a legal basis for interven-
tion.269 The Court therefore concluded that the justifications for INT2 were 
largely political and not an expression of a legal obligation or an assertion 
of existing international law rules as per the dimension of justification.270
To reiterate and illustrate the spectrum, the Court found that practice 
was largely ambiguous because some states intervened in third states, while 
others did not engage in intervention at all.271 The Court also found that 
states traditionally expressed their opposition against intervention and sup-
ported the principle of non-intervention instead.272 Finally, states largely 
avoided justifying past interventions on the basis of a legal right to intervene 
and instead put forward foreign policy considerations.273
This produced at least two eligible interpretations that the Court juxta-
posed. INT1: There is a CIL norm of non-intervention. States primarily re-
frain from intervening in third states out of a sense of legal obligation that 
most states accept through various political statements that non-intervention 
is the rule. States thus justify instances of intervention by other means, such 
as that of the right to self-defense or foreign policy considerations. INT1 al-
so aligns with concurrent general principles of international law, such as the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that, at the time of the Nic-
aragua Case, were robust regarding the authority of a state to govern itself 
without interference.274 INT2: There is a CIL norm permitting foreign inter-
vention. This norm explains instances of intervention and suggests that non-
intervening states do so out of choice and not out of obligation. However, 
despite certain instances of practice, these were not coupled with a senti-
ment of a legal duty for intervention but were rather singled out as excep-
tions and justifications to the rule of non-intervention. Even though instanc-
es of intervention were sensational and popularized, they were also 
267. Id.
268. Id. ¶ 208.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. Id. ¶¶ 207–08.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See, e.g., ERSUN N. KURTULUS, STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONCEPT, PHENOMENON 
AND RAMIFICATIONS (2005); see also Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202.
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significantly scarcer than the instances of observance and were based either 
on factual claims or existing justifications on the part of offending states. 
Out of the two possible interpretations, given the findings of the interpretive 
process, the most coherent interpretation of fit and justification within a 
wide reflective equilibrium is INT1. In other words that there is a CIL norm 
of non-intervention, in line with the finding of the Court.
Charlesworth also criticized the ICJ in Nicaragua for creating a type of 
instant law because it was prepared to find both practice and opinio juris in 
a single action through accession to a treaty or a vote on an IO resolution.275
The Court stretched not only the legislative effects of both IO resolutions, 
but also the impact that treaty rules have on CIL.276 This is because the 
boundaries of whether elements of CIL represent lex lata or lex ferenda, as 
well as the distinction between normative description and prescription, re-
main largely unsettled in international law.
Constructive interpretation again offers a different lens. As discussed 
earlier, the dimensions of fit and justification take roughly the form of nor-
mativity and descriptivity.  Interpretation begins with the construction of a 
theory that best justifies a practice through the dimension of justification, 
while the dimension of fit determines and describes this practice. Fit and 
justification are not two distinct moments in the interpretive process, but in-
stead two related concepts that do different kinds of work: one descriptive 
and one normative.277 For an interpretive CIL theory, the fact that a single 
act, such as the adoption of IO resolutions, may constitute both a descriptive 
narrative of history and practice as well as a normative justification of this 
practice is not only not problematic, but is, in fact, expected and desirable. 
This reflects the thicker conception of opinio juris of the interpretive theory 
that cuts across the distinction between description and normativity and is 
able to infuse fact with value. Constructive interpretation thus offers a sys-
tematic, methodological paradigm that undermines the salience of the cri-
tiques of the Nicaragua decision regarding CIL identification.
Conclusion
The definition and scope of CIL has always been a site of contestation.
This not only creates gaps between existing international law and legal ex-
pectation, but also casts doubt on the very nature of CIL as law. Internation-
al law largely expanded to reflect the changing realities of the international 
system by incorporating new phenomena and actors in the process of main-
taining a sustainable system. The framework of international law, and par-
ticularly that of CIL, has fallen behind. To this day, CIL identification is 
275. Charlesworth, supra note 216, at 24.
276. See D’Amato, supra note 51, at 102.
277. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 555 
(2010).
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trapped in the methodological divide between induction and deduction. Ac-
cording to the inductive method, one attempts to identify CIL from ‘facts’ of 
international life.278 The deductive method focuses instead on the abstract 
and deduces CIL norms from general propositions, usually deriving from a 
non-factual and normative authority.279 However, this divide persists with-
out a largely accepted position on which method is preferable or more au-
thoritative.
The goal of this Article is to suggest a new methodological approach for 
CIL identification: the method of constructive interpretation. This method 
incorporates the dimensions of descriptive accuracy and normative justifica-
tion and seeks to balance these elements within a reflective equilibrium. I 
contend that this reflective interpretive approach results in a more sophisti-
cated understanding of fit (state practice) and justification (opinio juris) and 
provides a nuanced method for reconciling their relationship in CIL identifi-
cation. To support this, I revisited one of the classic cases in international 
law: Nicaragua v. United States. I argue against the idea that the ICJ in Nic-
aragua departed from the traditional method of CIL identification and in-
stead propose that the Court, in fact, engaged in an interpretive process. I 
suggest that the Court in Nicaragua asked one primary question about the 
existence of a CIL rule—namely, the norm of non-intervention—and conse-
quently juxtaposed two different possible interpretations to answer this 
question: INT1: There is a CIL norm of non-intervention; and INT2: There 
is a CIL norm allowing foreign intervention. By then engaging in a reflec-
tive process of assessing the dimensions of fit and justification, the Court 
reached a reflective equilibrium on the existence of a norm of non-
intervention.
Through the Nicaragua case, the ICJ managed—likely inadvertently—
to escape the methodological divide of induction versus deduction. That is 
why the Nicaragua case is best defended as endorsing an interpretive theory 
of CIL identification. However, the analysis of the Nicaragua case through 
constructive interpretation is only one example of the potential applications 
of the interpretive method to recent developments in scholarship or future 
adjudication, such as the questions of humanitarian intervention, the emerg-
ing notion of Responsibility to Protect, or contested issues beyond the law 
on the use of force.
To maintain an international legal system that is not only current but al-
so desirable and encourages compliance, we need to approach international 
lawmaking as a dynamic process with ongoing changes that require concep-
tual clarity and legal certainty, but also adaptation. Freeing the identification 
of CIL from the restrictive dichotomy of induction versus deduction opens 
up new avenues for the normative and methodological exploration of inter-
national law in today’s pluralistic international system. We can no longer 
278. See Kammerhofer, supra note 20, at 557.
279. See id.
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afford to sustain means and methods because a particular process is the way 
we used to do things at a different time in a different international system. 
That is just bad reasoning.
